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Abstract 
 
Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) is a prominent neuroscientific hypothesis 
about the mechanisms implementing decision-making. This paper argues that, since its 
inception, the SMH has not been clearly formulated. It is possible to identify at least two 
different hypotheses, which make different predictions: SMH-G, which claims that somatic 
states generally implement preferences and are needed to make a decision; and SMH-S, which 
specifically claims that somatic states assist decision-making by anticipating the long-term 
outcomes of available options. This paper also argues that neither hypothesis is adequately 
supported empirically; the task originally proposed to test SMH is not a good test for SMH-S, 
and its results do not support SMH-G either. In addition, it is not clear how SMH-G could be 
empirically invalidated, given its general formulation. Suggestions are made that could help 
provide evidence for SMH-S, and make SMH-G more specific.  
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1  Introduction 
 
The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) was proposed by cognitive neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio in the early nineties and has garnered a great deal of attention in cognitive science 
ever since. The SMH was featured prominently in Damasio’s influential book Descartes’ 
Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (Damasio [1994]), and has made its way into 
philosophical discussions of the nature of rationality and its relation to emotion (e.g. 
Blackburn [1998]; Churchland [1996]; DeLancey [2002]; Greenspan [2005]; Ledwig [2006]; 
Pizarro [2000]; Roskies [2003]; Thagard [2001]), as well as into sociology (Elster [1999]) and 
neuroeconomics (Bechara and Damasio [2005]).  
In Descartes’ Error Damasio argued that reason, rather than being opposed to 
emotion, instead requires it. This proposal was not altogether new in philosophy; notably de 
Sousa ([1987], p. 195) had already argued that emotion assists “pure reason” in the retrieval 
of relevant information, i.e. emotion is ‘one of Nature’s ways of dealing with the 
philosophers’ frame problem’. Damasio ([1994]) referred in particular to studies from his 
laboratory suggesting that the capacity to make decisions is severely compromised in patients 
in which the brain mechanisms responsible for integrating reasoning and emotion are 
disrupted. The SMH was originally formulated to make sense of these findings, and to 
provide a model of how the brain organizes the interaction of emotion and decision-making. 
Specifically, “emotion” in this context refers to a set of changes in bodily arousal or 
activation—or, at least, to the neural representations of such changes. Damasio calls the latter 
“as-if body loops”, and describes them as brain mechanisms that can misrepresent the state 
and activity of the body, namely trick the brain into believing that the body is in a specific 
state of arousal, when in fact it is not (Damasio [1994], p. 184; see also Damasio [1999], 
[2003]). “Somatic markers” are thus emotional bodily (or “as-if-bodily” brain) processes that, 
according to Damasio, interact with our ability to reason and generate options, and are 
necessary for making decisions.1  
In the past few years, however, several laboratories have questioned the empirical 
work that Damasio and his group have done to validate the SMH, and have proposed 
alternative, more parsimonious interpretations of their data. Several scientists now believe that 
the SMH needs more empirical support (for a comprehensive review of the experimental 
literature related to the SMH, see Dunn et al. [2006]).  
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In this paper I will argue that the issue between Damasio and his critics is not merely 
an empirical one, to be settled by further experiments. There are also conceptual issues that 
need to be clarified. Specifically I will show that, since its inception, the SMH has not been 
clearly formulated. I will argue that what is usually referred to as “the SMH” amounts in fact 
to at least two distinct and logically independent hypotheses. One hypothesis (which I shall 
call SMH-G) is rather general, and claims that somatic markers are embodied preferences 
necessary for choosing among options. The other hypothesis (SMH-S) attributes a more 
specific role to somatic markers; it states that somatic markers are embodied preferences 
needed to be able to consider the long-term outcomes of available options. These two 
hypotheses, as we will see, make different predictions; in order to formulate adequate 
experimental tests it is thus crucial to distinguish between them. 
Conceptual issues arise also in relation to the interpretation of the experimental results 
allegedly supporting the SMH. I will argue that neither SMH-S nor SMH-G are adequately 
supported empirically, albeit for different reasons. In particular, the Iowa Gambling Task 
(Bechara et al. [1994]), used by Damasio and his group to support SMH-S, turns out not to be 
a good test for it; also, it does not provide evidence for SMH-G either. As for SMH-G, it is 
hard to see how it could be disproved in the laboratory, given the very general definition of 
somatic markers it relies on.  
These problems do not imply that the question of whether and how somatic-emotional 
processes are involved in decision-making is not interesting and not worth pursuing. The 
take-away message of this paper is that more still needs to be done, conceptually and 
empirically, in order to address that question properly. Specifically, more finely grained 
distinctions need to be drawn to design adequate experiments that could help make some 
progress in this interesting research area. 
 
2  Two hypotheses:  Somatic markers as embodied preferences, and as a source of 
farsightedness 
 
The formulation of the SMH was preceded by the observation and study of the 
neuropsychological patient known as EVR (“Elliot” in Damasio [1994]). As Eslinger and 
Damasio ([1985]) tell us, at the age of 35 EVR was diagnosed with a brain tumour and 
underwent bilateral surgical excision of ventromedial prefrontal cortices (VMPFC). Before 
the operation, EVR was leading a successful life and was described by his relatives as an 
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excellent student, a “role model” and a “natural leader”. At 25 he was employed as a staff-
accountant in a home-building firm, and at 32 he was promoted chief accountant and became 
comptroller; he married at 25 and at the time of the operation he had two children. The 
operation is described as uneventful, and EVR was discharged two weeks later. He returned 
to work after a three-month recovery period, and soon became involved in a business 
partnership with a man who had been fired earlier from the company, apparently because of 
his questionable reputation. Despite warnings from relatives, EVR invested all his money in 
this partnership, and eventually declared bankruptcy. He had shorter jobs after that, and was 
fired from each one because of disorganization and tardiness. His wife left with the children 
after seventeen years of marriage, and just one month after the divorce EVR remarried 
(against the advice of his relatives), and divorced again two years later.  
Two years after the operation and before being referred to Damasio’s unit, EVR was 
re-evaluated and no tumour was detected. He scored well and above average in IQ, memory 
and personality tests. Yet his employment problems continued, and we are told that:  
 
[h]e needed about 2 hours to get ready for work in the morning, and some days were 
consumed entirely by shaving and hair-washing. Deciding where to dine might take 
hours, as he discussed each restaurant’s seating plan, particulars of menu, atmosphere, 
and management. […] Purchasing small items required in-depth consideration of 
brands, prices, and the best method of purchase. He clung to outdated and useless 
possessions, refusing to part with dead houseplants, old phone books, six broken fans, 
five broken television sets, three bags of empty orange juice concentrate cans, 15 
cigarette lighters, and countless stacks of old newspapers. (Eslinger and Damasio 
[1985], p. 1732) 
 
Once in Damasio’s lab, EVR performed a series of psychometric tests, neurological and 
personality evaluations; his performance in all of them resulted normal, or well above 
average. During interviews, EVR showed superior knowledge of complex economical and 
financial matters; in addition, when presented with problems requiring social and moral 
judgments, EVR’s replies were reasonable and analogous to those of healthy subjects (see 
also Saver and Damasio [1991]).  
Note that this characterization presents EVR’s impairment in dual terms. On the one 
hand, EVR is portrayed as generally not spontaneously motivated for action: ‘he rarely acted 
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on impulse, spending instead an inordinate amount of time reviewing detailed and not 
necessarily pertinent aspects of a proposition without keeping the whole problem in 
perspective’ (Eslinger and Damasio [1985], p. 1739). EVR has difficulties making and 
implementing decisions, and tends to procrastinate. When he acts, we are told, it is mainly in 
reaction to the advice of friends and relatives, and under strong environmental pressure. On 
this account, in short, EVR is indecisive and inactive: when faced with options, he becomes 
lost in thought, wavers continuously between possibilities, and cannot implement any 
decision. 
On the other hand, EVR is also described as making decisions, for example as taking 
actions against his relatives’ and friends’ advice. In these cases he does not procrastinate, and 
he appears motivated; he certainly does things, yet things that turn out to have infelicitous 
consequences for himself in the long term. On this second account, EVR is then a bad 
decision-maker not because he does not make up his mind and does not take action; quite the 
opposite, because he acts impulsively, namely without consideration for the long-term 
consequences of his decisions. 
The SMH was originally advanced to make sense of EVR’s impairment, and is in fact 
characterized by the same duality. In the paper that first formulated the hypothesis, Damasio 
et al. ([1990], p. 83) proposed that EVR’s problem is that he ‘cannot choose an advantageous 
course of action’, and speculated that this incapacity is due to a 
 
failure to activate the specific somatic states, both visceral and skeletal, that were part 
of the previous learning of a given social situation. […] During learning, somatic 
states, positive or negative, […] appose a marker to entities and events. When somatic 
states are reactivated, we believe that they also […] mark the appropriately recalled 
set. They mark unambiguously not only the value of current perceptions, but most 
importantly, the value of certain outcomes to given courses of action […] Somatic 
states provide an automated way for the brain to select […] among response options. 
(ibid., emphasis in original) 
 
On the one hand, this passage characterizes somatic markers as bodily states that 
indicate (“mark”) the value of possible options. Somatic markers develop through experience 
as various bodily states become associated with positive and negative events. When one 
contemplates possible options before making a decision, somatic signals are re-enacted, 
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which “mark” such options as either positive or negative and thus allow one to choose. 
Somatic markers thus appear to be “embodied preferences”, that is, bodily signals that carry 
value and that allow the reasoning system to weigh options and ultimately make a decision.  
On the other hand, the text quoted above also mentions ‘certain outcomes’ and 
continues, ‘[b]y forcing attention on a conflict, a pertinent somatic marker would signal the 
ultimately deleterious consequences that might arise from a response that might nonetheless 
bring immediate reward’ (Damasio et al. [1990], p. 83, my emphasis). Damasio et al. ([1991], 
p. 220) similarly claimed that somatic signals mark the “future”—in the sense of the 
“ultimate” or “long-term”—consequences of a decision: ‘normal individuals can be assisted 
in the complex decision-making process by the appearance of a somatic signal that marks the 
ultimate consequences of the response option’ (emphasis in original); a certain response 
option, ‘regardless of its predictable immediate reward, can evoke a future scenario that is 
potentially threatening to the individual, and is marked by a negative somatic state’ (ibid.). On 
this account, somatic markers provide farsightedness, namely they induce the decision-maker 
to consider future, long-term or “ultimate” consequences of available options instead of 
focussing exclusively on immediate or short-term consequences, and they tell her which of 
them is preferable.2  
This dual specification of the function of somatic markers corresponds to the 
previously noted dual characterization of EVR as indecisive and inactive, and yet also as 
impulsive, and pervades subsequent works on the SMH. Damasio ([1994]), for example, often 
describes EVR as unable to choose among options, as cool-blooded, and with a “flat” 
decision-making landscape (ibid., pp. 50-1); also, EVR formulates plans but does not 
implement them (p. 55). In line with this description, Damasio ([1994)] draws several 
analogies between EVR and other patients who are unable to make decisions in the personal 
and social domain, who show no willingness to cooperate with the therapist and no 
motivation to get better (see the description of anosognosics on p. 67); he also notes 
similarities between EVR and patients who manifest a pervasive impairment of drives (p. 73). 
These and other passages (pp. 193-4) are all consistent with the account of EVR as inactive. 
In developing this characterization, Damasio ([1994]) also criticizes “models of rational 
decision-making” which, on his view, assume that decisions are made merely on the basis of 
logical reasoning. According to him, engaging in complex calculations of costs and benefits 
when faced with several options is not a good strategy to make decisions: 
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if this strategy is the only one you have available, rationality […] is not going to work. 
At best, your decision will take an inordinately long time, far more than acceptable if 
you are to get anything else done that day. At worst, you may not even end up with a 
decision at all because you will get lost in the byways of your calculation. (Damasio 
[1994], p. 172, emphasis in original) 
 
 Damasio’s proposal, in sum, appears here to be that somatic markers assist logical 
reasoning by embodying preferences; somatic markers are needed to avoid becoming lost in 
thought and consequently incapable of taking action.3  
In other contexts however Damasio ([1994]) gives a characterization of the function of 
somatic markers that is consistent with the account of EVR as impulsive rather than 
indecisive and inactive. According to this second characterization, somatic markers are 
necessary ‘to learn to be guided by future prospects rather than by immediate outcomes’ 
(Damasio [1994], p. 218). Absence of somatic markers accordingly induces the inability to 
‘generate automated predictions of the significance of a future outcome’ (ibid., p. 219).  
The same duality reappears in more recent formulations of the SMH: 
 
In the absence of somatic markers, response options and outcomes become more or 
less equalized. Subjects may then resort to a strategy of deciding on an option based 
on extremely slow and laborious logic operations over many potential alternatives, 
themselves lacking somatic markers, and hence fail to be timely, accurate, and 
propitious. Another possible consequence of missing somatic markers is that decision 
making may become random or impulsive. (Tranel et al. [2000], p. 1049)  
 
Bechara and Damasio ([2005], p. 339) write that the lack of somatic markers due to VMPFC 
damage ‘degrades the speed of deliberation (e.g. choosing between two brands of cereal may 
take a patient a very long time because of endless reasoned analyses of the pros and cons of 
each brand), and also degrades the adequacy of the choice, i.e. patients may choose 
disadvantageously’ (my emphasis). In a recent review, Dunn et al. ([2006], p. 242) say that, 
according to the SMH, lack of somatic markers leads to ‘a marked decision-making 
impairment characterised by either extreme procrastination or the selection of inappropriate 
response options’ (my emphasis). 
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To sum up, there appear to be at least two somatic marker hypotheses, which are 
logically independent and which make different predictions: 
(1) The first hypothesis is rather general and I shall thus indicate it with “SMH-G”. 
This hypothesis claims that somatic markers embody preferences which allow decision-
makers to choose among options. It predicts that lack of somatic markers will induce inability 
to choose, procrastination and inactivity; the decision-maker does not have preferences, is 
caught in endless reasoning, and cannot make any decision. 
(2) The second hypothesis attributes a more specific role to somatic markers, and I 
shall call it “SMH-S”. SMH-S states that somatic markers provide farsightedness i.e. they are 
necessary to consider and evaluate the long-term consequences of an option. Unlike SMH-G, 
this hypothesis predicts that lack of somatic markers will induce impulsive decisions, namely 
decisions driven only by a concern for immediate or short-term outcomes; the decision-maker 
cannot value the long-term consequences of his choices and makes decisions that provide 
only short-term advantages.4  
 
3  Lack of evidence for somatic farsightedness 
 
What evidence is there in support of either hypothesis? Consider first SMH-S. The empirical 
evidence that Damasio and colleagues have relied most heavily on to support the SMH refers 
to the results of what is now known as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). This task was first 
proposed by Bechara et al. ([1994], p. 8) in the attempt to simulate ‘in real time, personal 
real-life decision-making relative to the way it factors uncertainty of premises and outcomes, 
as well as reward and punishment’.  
At the beginning of the IGT, the subject is in front of four decks of cards and is given 
a $2000 loan of play money. The subject is told that the experiment involves selecting one 
card at a time from any deck, for an indefinite amount of time until told to stop. The subject is 
also told that, after every card turn, she will win some money; sometimes, however, she will 
also lose some money. The amount of the reward (or of the reward and of the penalty), will be 
announced after each card turn. Finally, the subject is told that the goal of the task is to 
maximize profit on the initial loan of money. 
 Unbeknownst to the subject, the schedule of rewards and punishments is pre-
programmed as follows (see table 1): turning a card from the first two decks (A and B) always 
yields $100, whereas turning a card from the other two decks (C and D) always yields $50. 
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All decks, however, also yield occasional losses; specifically, 10 card selections from either A 
or B yield a total loss of $1250, and 10 selections from either C or D yield a total loss of 
$250. In sum, turning 10 cards from either A or B produces a net loss of $250, whereas 
turning 10 cards from either C or D produces a net gain of $250; A and B are therefore called 
“bad decks”, and C and D “good decks”. Note that the distribution of penalties varies from 
deck to deck. In A, the $1250 loss that occurs every 10 cards is distributed over 5 cards 
(penalties range from $150 to $350); in B, it occurs all at once with one card turn. Similarly, 
in C the $250 loss that occurs every 10 cards is distributed over 5 (with penalties ranging 
from $25 to $75), whereas in D it occurs all at once. 
 
table 1 about here 
 
Bechara et al. ([1994]) showed that, in this task, patients with damage to VMPFC 
(like EVR) behave differently from healthy subjects. The latter initially sampled all decks and 
showed a preference for A and B in the early trials; as the experiment continued, however, 
they came to prefer C and D (on average between the 20th and 40th card selection) and kept 
selecting more cards from these decks until the end of the experiment (namely, after 100 card 
selections). As a result, they ended the task with a net gain. VMPFC subjects behaved like 
healthy subjects in the early trials, but then failed to develop a preference for C and D. 
Overall, they picked more cards from A and B and thus ended the task with a net loss.  
In a later study, Bechara et al. ([1996]) also measured the somatic markers of IGT 
participants by measuring skin conductance responses5 (SCRs). Three types of response were 
distinguished: (1) reward SCRs, generated after a card selection that yields a gain; (2) 
punishment SCRs, generated after a card selection that yields a loss; (3) anticipatory SCRs 
(aSCRs henceforth) generated prior to any card selection (i.e. during the time lapse between 
completion of the money exchange and the next card selection). Results showed that VMPFC 
subjects generated SCRs only in response to card selection, whereas controls (healthy and 
other brain damaged subjects) also generated aSCRs. In particular, they generated stronger 
aSCRs to the bad decks than the good ones.  
Bechara et al. ([1994]) interpreted their results as showing that VMPFC subjects have 
a “myopia for the future”—in other words, as I shall put it here, that they are shortsighted. On 
this interpretation, VMPFC subjects prefer A and B throughout the task because they are 
interested only in the high immediate rewards of these two decks (compared to the lower 
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immediate rewards of C and D), and are blind to the future or long-term disadvantageous 
consequences of this strategy.6 In line with this interpretation, Bechara et al. ([1996], pp. 215-
6, p. 223) suggested that VMPFC subjects’ failure to generate aSCRs is a failure to consider 
the future or long-term outcomes of their card selections. In their view, VMPFC subjects 
choose A and B because they lack somatic markers informing them of the long-term 
disadvantageous character of these decks.  
Yet importantly the interpretation of VMPFC subjects as shortsighted is unwarranted, 
because maximizing profit on the IGT does not require farsightedness. To see this, it is useful 
to imagine how a subject who was interested only in maximizing expected gain on the next 
card would behave. Such a subject, using past rewards and penalties as a guide to what to 
expect on the next card, might very well favour A and B at first, and, once A and B start to 
yield more losses than gains, reverse this preference, exactly as normal subjects do (as tables 
2 and 3 show, in the original IGT the “bad decks” are objectively advantageous in the early 
trials; deck B, in particular, yields the first loss only when subjects hit card 9). There is no 
reason to think that a subject concerned with maximizing long-term gain, and a subject 
concerned with maximizing expected gain on the next card only, would behave differently.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
In other words, the IGT is not a task that allows discriminating between the decisions 
made by shortsighted subjects who are only concerned with maximizing expected benefit 
from the next card, and the decisions of farsighted subjects striving to maximize long-term 
benefit. The upshot is that to interpret the behaviour of VMPFC subjects in the IGT as due to 
shortsightedness is unwarranted. It might be that VMPFC are shortsighted, but the IGT is not 
a test that can establish this. As a consequence, the IGT cannot provide evidence in support of 
SMH-S. This hypothesis predicts that lack of somatic markers should induce indifference to 
long-term outcomes and impulsivity, but the IGT cannot reveal whether decisions are made 
on the basis of considerations of long-term or immediate outcomes. The IGT is thus not a 
good task to test SMH-S.  
The idea that the IGT requires farsightedness has been endorsed for quite some time 
by both critics and supporters of the SMH. An exception is Maia and McClelland ([2004]), 
who have shown that healthy IGT participants can identify the good decks without 
considering the long-term outcomes of their decisions. Maia and McClelland proposed a 
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variant of the original IGT where subjects were interrupted every 10 card selections starting 
from the 20th, and were presented with a detailed questionnaire aimed at assessing their 
conscious knowledge of the reward/punishment schedule of each deck. Results showed that 
from card selection 20 already, healthy IGT participants can calculate the outcomes obtained 
from a given deck and accordingly accurately estimate the outcome of the next card selection. 
As Maia and McClelland ([2004], p. 16080) rightly remarked, ‘[t]here is no sense in which a 
selection done at a certain point in time is associated with a loss that only becomes apparent 
later in the game’. It is intrinsic to the structure of the IGT that participants need not take into 
consideration delayed outcomes to maximize profit.7  
 In addition, alternative explanations of the role of somatic responses generated during 
the IGT by healthy subjects are now available, which do not appeal to farsightedness. Tomb 
et al. ([2002]) have pointed out that, in the original task, the magnitude of the gains and losses 
that follow selecting any card from the bad decks (A and B) is much higher than the 
magnitude of the gains and losses that follow selecting any card from the good decks (C and 
D). Assuming that the magnitude of SCRs produced in response to gains and losses is directly 
proportional to the amount of money involved (for example, a gain or loss of $300 yields 
stronger SCRs than a gain or loss of $50), Tomb et al. explained the development of stronger 
aSCRs to the bad decks as merely reflecting the participants’ covert expectation of the 
immediate outcome of those decks. Simply put, on this account aSCRs are higher before card 
selections from the bad decks because participants expect a higher-magnitude outcome, and 
not because aSCRs somehow mediate considerations of long-term outcomes. 
To test this interpretation, Tomb et al. designed a variant of the original IGT in which 
decks A and B are still disadvantageous yet associated with lower amounts of money—both 
for rewards and penalties—than the advantageous decks C and D (see table 4). Every 10 
cards, the good decks yield a gain of $2250 and a loss of $1500, and the bad decks yield a 
gain of $250 and a loss of $1000. In this task, normal subjects generated higher aSCRs to the 
advantageous decks, consistent with the hypothesis that aSCRs only reflect the expectation of 
the immediate outcome of the deck that is reached for at any given trial.8 
 
Table 4 about here 
  
 The upshot is that another experiment is needed to test SMH-S appropriately—an 
experiment that can unambiguously show when decisions are made on the basis of 
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consideration of immediate outcomes only, and when they are made by considering long-term 
consequences.  
Looking at work on delay discounting could be useful here. Delay discounting tasks 
show that, under specific conditions, subjects choose options with smaller yet immediate 
outcomes, as opposed to bigger yet delayed ones (see e.g. Bickel et al. [1999]). One could try 
to use similar experimental designs to discriminate decisions that are made considering the 
long-term future, from decisions that are made on the basis of short-term outcomes only. 
Evidence supporting SMH-S would then consist for example in finding out that, in healthy 
subjects, aSCRs precede farsighted decisions but not shortsighted ones.  
Relevant results could also come from comparing autonomic activity in 
characteristically “shortsighted patients” (such as drug abusers) and healthy subjects sensitive 
to long-term outcomes. It would be interesting also to track other measures of autonomic 
activity in participants, i.e. not only SCRs but also heart rate, blood pressure, pupil dilation, 
etc., and see whether shortsighted and farsighted decisions are preceded by different bodily 
signals respectively (see also the discussion below on how to measure somatic markers). 
  
4  Does making decisions require somatic markers, and can it be shown in the 
laboratory? 
 
SMH-S (the hypothesis that somatic responses mark long-term outcomes) thus lacks empirical 
evidence. What about SMH-G—the hypothesis that somatic responses are embodied 
preferences needed to make decisions?  
Note first that the behaviour of VMPFC subjects during the IGT does not lend support 
to the consideration that they lack preferences and are inactive.9 While engaged in the task, 
these subjects do appear to have preferences and to act on them by reliably choosing the “bad 
decks”. Lack of aSCRs thus does not seem to induce a total lack of preferences. It could 
perhaps be replied that punishment and reward SCRs are the somatic signals that implement 
VMPFC subjects’ preferences (recall that only aSCRs are impaired in these patients). It 
would still remain unexplained, however, how exactly somatic responses elicited after 
selecting a card causally contribute to the patients’ decisions (they would seem to be mere 
effects of losing or winning money). Whatever their function (if any), they do not appear to 
count as “markers” in the sense of somatic signals that covertly anticipate decisions, and it is 
not clear how they can influence subsequent choices.  
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Moreover, Bechara et al. ([1999]) themselves have shown that patients with bilateral 
damage to the amygdala, who lack not only aSCRs but also punishment and reward SCRs, 
behave similarly to VMPFC subjects on the IGT, namely they choose more cards from the 
“bad decks”. In sum, performance of both VMPCF and amygdala patients during the IGT 
does not seem to provide evidence for SMH-G; if anything, it suggests that somatic markers 
are not necessary to choose among options and to implement a decision.  
In addition, some of the studies that looked at the decision-making capacities of 
subjects with various impairments of bodily feedback appear to provide evidence against 
SMH-G, or at least against the claim that activation of the non-neural body is necessary for 
making decisions. In particular Heims et al. ([2004]) showed that patients with pure 
autonomic failure10 perform even better than healthy subjects on the IGT; and North and 
O’Carroll ([2001]) showed that patients with spinal cord lesions perform like healthy subjects 
on the IGT (see Dunn et al. [2006] for a comprehensive review). 
What recurrently emerges from this experimental literature however is that it is hard to 
disprove SMH-G in the laboratory, because somatic markers are very broadly characterized. 
Damasio ([1994], p. 206) for example writes: ‘the idea of the somatic marker encompasses an 
integral change of body state, which includes modifications in both the viscera and the 
musculoskeletal system, induced by both neural signals and chemical signals’. In addition, as 
we saw, Damasio counts as “somatic markers” also those brain mechanisms (the “as-if body 
loops”) that represent the state and activity of the body, and that can also misrepresent the 
latter by being activated when the body is not (e.g. Damasio [1994], p. 184). This 
characterization implies that there are many ways to detect somatic markers. Changes in 
processes controlled by the autonomic nervous system, such as skin conductance, but also 
heart rate, blood pressure, pupillary size and endocrine gland activity (to mention only some) 
would all be indicative of somatic markers; to which we ought to add changes in processes 
independent of autonomic nervous control, such as eyeblink, muscle activity, tension and 
joint position; and, finally, neural representations of those bodily changes, which can also be 
misrepresentations. 
It follows from this broad characterization of somatic markers that if a subject turns 
out to be able to make decisions despite abnormalities in some measures of somatic markers, 
it is still possible that some other, undetected source of somatic markers might implement the 
subjects’ preferences. The large and vaguely specified number of such sources makes it 
virtually impossible to disprove SMH-G. In fact, significantly, both Heims et al. ([2004], p. 
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1986) and North and O’Carroll ([2001], p. 523) remarked that their results do not allow 
drawing definitive conclusions about the role of somatic markers in decision-making, because 
sources of bodily feedback other than those impaired could have guided appropriate 
performance on the IGT;11 also, as-if body loops could have been in place to support 
appropriate behaviour.  
It seems then that a more specific definition of somatic markers is needed for SMH-G 
to become a more precise and testable hypothesis about the place of bodily processes in 
decision-making.  
In particular, it would seem to be important to distinguish various dimensions of 
bodily and as-if bodily arousal, and to understand which ones, if any, are implicated in 
different aspects of decision-making. Research in the physiology of emotion now employs 
several measures of autonomic arousal, i.e. SCRs but also blood pressure, heart rate, skin 
temperature, etc. (see e.g. Christie and Friedman [2004]), and brain imaging techniques could 
also be used to measure activity in “as-if body” loops during various decision-making tasks. 
One could then identify various possible sources of “somatic markers” and, for each of them, 
try to understand whether they are in fact necessary for making decisions as well as good 
decisions.  
More precisely, one could try to understand which dimensions of arousal (bodily and 
as-if), if any, are necessary for specific aspects of decision-making. Making decisions in fact 
requires not only having preferences, but also generating options, keeping those options in 
mind, weighing possible outcomes, being motivated to choose one option among several 
ones, and eventually implementing the decision i.e. carrying out real-world actions. Damasio 
does not clearly pull these different aspects apart, and what I have identified as “SMH-G” 
remains ambiguous as to how somatic markers allow decision-makers to choose among 
options. Do somatic markers for example specifically embody preferences so that the 
decision-maker can retrieve what is relevant and what is not, or do somatic markers also (or 
perhaps only) provide the drive to carry out the decision and realize those preferences? 
It would be helpful here to specify the nature of the decision-making impairment of 
VMPFC subjects in more detail. On the one hand, as mentioned, Damasio sometimes claims 
that VMPFC subjects are able to formulate reasonable plans and to explain what ought to be 
done in various circumstances; and, as we saw, these subjects are not completely indifferent. 
What exactly then is the nature of their indecisiveness and inactivity? Perhaps they lack the 
drive to implement their preferences, rather than preferences altogether. Dunn et al. ([2006], 
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pp. 257-8) indeed discuss this possibility and conclude that “apathy” or “lack of motivation” 
requires further attention and could largely explain the nature of decision-making 
impairments in VMPFC subjects. Perhaps also a distinction could be introduced here between 
the capacity to formulate third- and first-person “oughts”. Whereas VMPFC subjects might be 
able to formulate reasonable plans about what ought to be done—their learning capacities are 
intact—,they  may lack personal engagement and drives that would allow them to apply those 
oughts to themselves (for some potentially relevant recent work here, see Koenigs et al. 
[2007]). Finally, it might be useful to distinguish between various degrees of “inactivity”; 
some depressive subjects, for example, are totally unmotivated, and they differ from other 
depressive subjects who attempt or even commit suicide. In other words, motivation appears 
to come in degrees, and it may be interesting to investigate whether such degrees correlate 
with different levels of arousal (bodily and as-if); and, if so, whether different dimensions of 
arousal are somehow implicated in different degrees of motivation. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Damasio and colleagues’ work has generated much interest and enthusiasm in those who want 
to emphasize that practical deliberation is implemented by a system in which reasoning and 
somatic-emotional activity are integrated and mutually supportive. However, this enthusiasm 
seems to be premature; more needs to be done to understand the role of arousal (bodily as 
well as “as-if” bodily) in decision-making. As I have emphasized, the issues to be addressed 
are not only experimental, but also conceptual. One can be “a bad decision-maker” in various 
ways—for example in the sense that one always procrastinates (i.e. fails to make decisions), 
or in the sense that one fails to consider the long-term outcomes of the options available (i.e. 
makes impulsive decisions). These senses must be clearly distinguished in order to formulate 
unambiguous predictions and to design appropriate experiments that can test them. As 
discussed, formulations of the “somatic marker hypothesis” have failed clearly to distinguish 
between these two senses, and have conflated what I called SMH-S and SMH-G.  
In addition and more specifically, I have shown that there are logical-conceptual 
problems in how Damasio and colleagues have tried to provide support to their hypotheses. 
First, their main source of evidence, the IGT, cannot unambiguously show whether 
participants make their choices by considering long-term outcomes, and therefore it is not a 
good test for the hypothesis SMH-S according to which somatic markers are specifically 
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required to make wise farsighted decisions. As such, the IGT should not be used to seek 
evidence for SMH-S; another experiment is needed that can unambiguously distinguish 
between shortsighted and farsighted decisions. 
A further conceptual difficulty that undermines attempts to track the role of the body 
in decision-making depends on the very broad characterization of “somatic markers”, which 
turn out to include all changes under the control of the autonomic and somatic nervous 
system, as well as neural representations thereof. Distinguishing various dimensions of neural 
and bodily arousal, and tracking their respective roles in various aspects of decision-making, 
would seem to be a step forward towards a more specific and more empirically tractable 
hypothesis.  
As we saw, there are plenty of other questions that still need to be addressed, to which 
we can add the following ones: What counts as an advantageous decision in real life? Is it 
possible to reproduce the features of real-life decision-making in the laboratory? Is it possible 
reliably to track different dimensions of bodily arousal during it? More also needs to be done 
to understand the nature of the deficit of VMPFC patients, and its alleged relation to impaired 
SCRs. Finally, there is the question of whether considering the body a vehicle of cognition 
provides explanatory advantages. The current trend toward an interdisciplinary approach to 
decision-making has the potential to throw light on some of these issues. Hopefully, the 
debate on the role of the body in decision-making will continue, with new experimental 
designs that can reproduce the structure of real-life decision-making, and with increased 
attention to definitional and conceptual issues.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Damasio sometimes mentions that somatic markers can also be “feelings” (see e.g. the 
discussion in Damasio [1994], pp. 184-7) and in more recent work he extensively discusses 
the relationship between bodily states, emotions and feelings (Damasio [1999], [2003]). 
These issues relate to his broader account of emotion and consciousness, and I shall not 
address them here. The focus of this paper is specifically the SMH as a neuroscientific 
hypothesis as developed and debated in the experimental literature. The experiments I am 
concerned with, as we will see, take somatic markers to be bodily signals that covertly guide 
decision-making, and do not examine feelings. 
2 Damasio and colleagues use the expressions “long-term”, “future” and “ultimate” outcomes 
interchangeably, as well as “immediate” and “short-term” outcomes, and I shall do the same 
here. In real life, the boundary between the immediate, short- and long-term consequences of 
one’s decisions is of course fuzzy, and it is not clear that there are “ultimate” consequences of 
any decision. As we will see, the meaning of all these terms is clearest in the context of the 
Iowa Gambling Task. The contrast between short- and farsighted decisions still makes sense 
however also in real-life contexts—compare for example the decision to buy cheap fancy yet 
uncomfortable shoes, versus investing money in an expensive yet durable and comfortable 
pair. 
3 This formulation leaves it ambiguous whether somatic markers provide preferences, or 
specifically the drive to implement those preferences into real actions. I shall come back to 
this issue at the end of section 4.  
4 It is worth pointing out that additional versions of the SMH can be found that have 
subsequently dropped out from the debate without discussion. The existence of these other 
versions is further evidence of the difficulty that  Damasio and collaborators had in coming up 
with one clear hypothesis. Damasio et al. ([1990]) for example suggested that somatic 
markers signal a conflict between the value of the immediate and the delayed outcome of a 
given option; and Damasio et al. ([1990], [1991]) claimed that somatic markers allow 
conscious and unconscious inhibition of one’s response to immediate punishment, and that 
they thus help resolve the perceived conflict between the value of short-term and long-term 
consequences. Damasio ([1994]) also often maintains that somatic markers constrain the 
space of options before logical reasoning is applied. 
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5 Changes in skin conductance are detected via electrodes placed on two fingers and 
connected to a polygraph; when electrical current is passed between the electrodes and the 
skin’s sweat glands secrete fluid, conductivity is increased. Measuring SCRs thus means 
measuring the change in the amount of current conducted by the skin between the electrodes. 
Because sweat gland activity is controlled by sympathetic nerve activity, measures of SCRs 
are traditionally used to monitor the autonomic nervous system. 
6 See the following claims in (Bechara et al. [1994]): ‘we find that prefrontal patients, unlike 
controls, are oblivious to the future consequences of their actions, and seem to be guided by 
immediate prospects only’ (p. 7); ‘[t]he subjects must rely on their ability to develop an 
estimate of which decks are risky and which are profitable in the long run’ (p. 13); ‘these 
subjects are unresponsive to future consequences, whatever they are, and are thus more 
controlled by immediate prospects’ (p. 14). 
7 In a later work, Bechara and colleagues presented a variant of the IGT in which, they claim, 
they ‘reversed the order of reward and punishment, i.e. the punishment became immediate 
and the reward became delayed’ (Bechara et al. [2000], p. 2190). Again, this characterization 
is misleading. In this variant, the advantageous decks always yield a loss of $100, and 
occasional gains of $150, $200, $250, $300, $350, or $1250; the disadvantageous decks 
always yield a loss of $50, and occasional gains of $25, $50, $75, or $250 (see table in 
Bechara et al. [2000], p. 2193, for detailed distribution). There is no sense in which a specific 
card selection is associated with a gain that becomes apparent only later in the game. The 
“overall gain (or loss)” (namely the advantageous or disadvantageous character of each deck) 
is the sum of the gains and losses acquired with each card, and is apparent only after the 
relevant selections have been made. For this reason, the variant proposed by Bechara et al. 
([2000]) cannot be used to provide evidence for their claim that VMPFC  subjects are 
insensitive to future consequences and are primarily guided by immediate prospects. 
8 Note that although Tomb et al. ([2002]) ruled out the idea that anticipatory somatic signals 
mark long-term outcomes, they still endorsed Bechara and colleagues’ interpretation that the 
IGT requires farsightedness. They concluded in fact that ‘across both experiments, card 
selection is driven by long-term consequences, whereas anticipatory SCRs are driven by the 
immediate act to be performed’ (Tomb et al. [2002], p. 1104, my emphasis). Yet not only is 
card selection in the IGT not driven by long-term consequences; it does not seem that Tomb 
et al. can draw such a conclusion for their study either. In their variant task, selecting from the 
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good decks always yields a gain of $225, whereas selecting from the bad decks always yields 
a much lower gain of $25. Participants are thus likely to figure out very soon—perhaps they 
never have any doubt—that the good (bad, respectively) decks are actually advantageous 
(disadvantageous), without having to reverse their initial preferences; and, in particular, 
without considering any long-term consequence. 
9 See Bechara et al. ([1994], p. 14): ‘these patients possess and can access the requisite 
knowledge to conjure up options of actions and scenarios of future outcomes […] Their 
defect seems to be at the level of acting on such knowledge’. 
10 Pure autonomic failure involves a peripheral degeneration of sympathetic and 
parasympathetic autonomic neurons, and results in an inability to modulate bodily state via 
the autonomic nervous system. Patients affected by pure autonomic failure do not generate 
skin responses. 
11 Note however that, taken together, the studies of Heims et al. ([2004]) and North and 
O’Carroll ([2001]) rule out many sources of bodily feedback as potential candidates for 
“somatic markers” causally involved in appropriate decision-making on the IGT. 
